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Abstract
Accurate assessment of earnings capacity is critical to the efficient operation of dis-
ability insurance (DI) programs. We use administrative data on the universe of Dutch
DI recipients to estimate employment and earnings responses to reassessment of their
earnings capacity under more stringent rules. We estimate that reassessment of recip-
ients aged 30-44 removed 17 percent from the program and reduced benefit income by
20 percent, on average. In response, employment increased by 6.7 percentage points
and earnings rose by 18 percent. Recipients were able to increase earnings by e636
for every e1000 reduction in DI benefit. This earnings response was strongest from
those with more subjectively defined disabilities and a shorter claim duration, as well
as younger and female recipients.
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1 Introduction
Disability insurance (DI) is intended to compensate for lost earnings capacity. The difficulty
lies in determining how much has been lost. Overly stringent assessment leaves people
underinsured. Overly lax assessment encourages moral hazard. Evidence on the earnings
response to reduced DI entitlement resulting from stricter assessment of the earnings capacity
of benefit recipients can help determine whether the right balance has been struck.
This paper uses administrative data on the universe of Dutch DI recipients to estimate
the impact on earnings, and employment, of reassessment of their earnings capacity under
more stringent criteria that could result in benefits being terminated or cut substantially. If
the reassessments were effective in identifying recipients with untapped earnings potential,
then reduced benefits should have raised earnings. If, on the other hand, the reassessments
were overly aggressive or poorly targeted, then the earnings response would be muted. We
estimate the average effect of reassessment on earnings and scale this by the average reduction
in benefits to assess the effectiveness and targeting of the upward revisions made to earnings
capacity. In doing so, we extend the evidence base on the labor supply effects of DI —
the second largest item of social insurance expenditure in many countries — by adding to
only a handful of studies that estimate effects of cutting the entitlement of current benefit
recipients (Borghans et al. 2014; Deuchert and Eugster 2019; Deshpande 2016; Moore 2015).
We identify the effect of a 2004 reform by comparing the change in earnings (and other
outcomes) of DI recipients aged 30-44, whose entitlement was reassessed under stricter cri-
teria, with the respective change among older recipients, who were not reassessed. Unlike
studies that rely on difference-in-differences (DID) between age groups to identify effects
of more stringent criteria at application for DI (Karlström et al. 2008; Staubli 2011), we
adjust for the age difference in the outcome trend over a period prior to the reform. This
trend-adjusted DID (Bell et al. 1999) eliminates age-specific trends, as well as period effects.
Identification rests on the assumption that, in the absence of the reform, the difference be-
tween age groups in the outcome trends would have been the age group difference in the
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trends observed in the earlier period. Consistent with this, we demonstrate that the age
differential in the trends is similar over multiple periods prior to the reform. A placebo test
also lends credibility to the identification: implementing the empirical strategy with data on
individuals who are not DI recipients, we find no “effect” of a pseudo reform on earnings.
We estimate that, on average over all DI recipients aged 30-44 targeted for reassessment,
application of the more stringent rules reduced the amount of DI income received by 20
percent relative to what it would have been if there were no reform, raised employment by
20 percent and increased earnings by 18 percent; implying high elasticities of employment
and earnings with respect to benefits. Receiving e1000 less from DI was compensated by
earning e636 more in the labor market, on average. Apparently, some younger Dutch DI
recipients had considerable untapped earnings potential that more stringent assessment of
their benefit entitlement induced them to utilize.
The Netherlands provides an interesting context in which to assess the earnings potential
of DI recipients. It is known for high DI dependency that reached 12% of the insured
population at the beginning of the 1990s but also for a series of reforms, such as the one we
examine, that are claimed to have contributed to a two-fifths reduction in this dependency
(Koning and Lindeboom 2015). Countries, such as the US, looking for ways to manage
the escalating fiscal burden of DI can potentially learn from the Dutch experience (Autor
2015; Burkhauser et al. 2014). By examining a reform that occurred a decade into the
paring back of an initially generous program, we deliver evidence that is more relevant to
the situation prevailing in other countries than the evaluation by Borghans et al. (2014)
of an earlier Dutch reform that took effect when DI dependency was substantially higher
than elsewhere.1 Our estimate of the rate at which earnings replaced lost DI income is
actually very close to that obtained by Borghans et al., indicating that even after a decade
of retrenchment some DI recipients still had considerable unused earnings potential they
1Koning and Lindeboom (2015) argue that benefit cuts played a relatively minor role in reducing entry
to DI in the Netherlands, while acknowledging the effect of the 1993 reform examined by Borghans et al.
(2014) on exit from the program. They do not mention the 2004 reform we evaluate.
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could call on to replace around two thirds of substantial reductions in benefits. However,
it is important to emphasize that these were a minority of the stock of DI recipients. Most
did not have their benefits reduced despite being subjected to reassessment of their earning
capacity under more stringent criteria.
Much of the evidence on the earnings crowd-out from DI comes from studies that follow
Bound (1989) in using the earnings of rejected applicants to place an upper bound on the
earnings potential of successful applicants (Chen and Van der Klaauw 2008; Von Wachter
et al. 2011).2 Exploitation of plausibly exogenous variation in the award or appeal probability
can eliminate upward bias in the estimated earnings potential at the time of application
(Autor et al. 2017; French and Song 2014; Maestas et al. 2013). But this quasi-experimental
strategy will still overestimate the average earnings potential of the stock of beneficiaries
if skills and preferences for work deteriorate while on DI (Bryngelson 2009; Svensson et al.
2010; Ving̊ard et al. 2004). Evidence obtained from comparison of accepted and rejected
applicants is pertinent to the impact of policies that tighten entry to DI. It is less relevant
to assessing the potential of reforms, such as the one we examine, that aim to release any
earnings potential of benefit recipients.
There are only a few studies that, like this one and Borghans et al (2014), estimate labor
supply responses of DI recipients to cuts made to their benefits. Moore (2015) finds that
22 percent of US Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) recipients entered employment
after being removed from the program because they had (partly) qualified through an ad-
dictive disorder. Deshpande (2016) estimates that 18-year-olds removed from another US
DI program following stricter medical review were able to increase earnings to an extent
sufficient to replace only one third of the benefit income lost. Relative to the cuts made
to benefits, these labor supply responses in the US are smaller than those of Dutch DI re-
cipients that we and Borghans et al. estimate. This may be due to differences in the DI
programs, but it could also reflect differences in the DI recipients studied. Those qualifying
2Chen and Van der Klaauw (2008) also obtain point estimates from a regression discontinuity in DI
entitlement based on age.
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through an addiction were only two percent of the stock of SSDI recipients, and their work
preferences and capacities may have been quite distinct. At the age of 18, the DI recipients
studied by Deshpande lacked the labor market experience that may have conditioned their
labor supply response to benefit cuts. We estimate responses of all recipients aged 30-44,
who comprise more than a third of the stock of DI recipients in the Netherlands, where, as
in other countries, the DI roll is becoming younger.
Besides being one of the few studies to estimate earnings responses to targeted reductions
in the benefit entitlement of DI recipients, this paper adds to the meager evidence on whether
and how these responses vary with time spent on DI (Autor et al. 2015; Gelber et al. 2017;
Moore 2015). Using claim durations of up to 15 years, which is substantially longer than
other studies, we find that reassessment induced a smaller earnings response from those
who had been claiming for longer. Interestingly, the earnings response of partially disabled
recipients who were working at the time of reassessment did not decline with claim duration.
We find that DI recipients who qualified through more subjectively defined health prob-
lems — mental health and musculoskeletal conditions — experienced the most aggressive
cuts in benefits, indicating the greatest upward revisions in assessed earnings capacity, and
were able to increase earnings to replace larger fractions of these cuts. This is consistent with
the argument that loosening of the criteria for DI entitlement from precisely defined medical
diagnoses to the more nebulous concept of work capacity lengthened DI rolls by opening the
door to claims based on difficult-to-verify health problems (Autor 2015; Autor and Duggan
2006).3
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines key features of the Dutch DI program
and the reform we evaluate. Section 3 sets out our identification strategy. Section 4 describes
3In 2012 across all OECD countries, mental health disorders were cited as the cause of one half of ongoing
DI claims (OECD 2012). Musculoskeletal problems are typically the second most common reason given for
a DI claim. Studies based on comparisons between accepted and rejected DI applicants in the US produce
contradictory evidence on whether claimants citing more subjective health problems have greater earnings
capacity (French and Song 2014; Maestas et al. 2013; Von Wachter et al. 2011). Moore (2015) finds that
among SSDI recipients who had partly qualified through an addiction, those with a primary diagnosis of a
mental health or a musculoskeletal condition were more likely to work after their benefits were terminated.
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the data and examines trends in the outcomes. Section 5 presents the results starting with
full sample estimates, then a placebo test and robustness analysis, followed by examination
of the relationship between earnings responses and claim duration, and then heterogeneity
analyses. The final section concludes.
2 Disability insurance in the Netherlands
2.1 Eligibility and benefits
The 2004 reform changed the details but not the general procedures for assessing DI eligibility
and benefit entitlement. Before describing the reform, we summarize those procedures.
An application for full disability benefits can be submitted after a period of sick pay,
which was one year in 2004. Application for partial disability benefits can be made while
in work. The Social Insurance Benefits Agency (UWV) conducts a medical assessment to
establish whether the applicant is completely incapable of work. If the agency’s physician
judges that the applicant has some residual work capacity, then a vocational expert identifies
specific occupations the applicant is considered capable of performing, taking educational
attainment into account. Earnings capacity is then approximated by the average salary
across the three highest paying of those occupations. Degree of disability is defined as the
proportionate shortfall of this earnings capacity from pre-disability earnings. If this is below
a threshold, which in 2004 was 15%, then the claim is rejected.4 If it is at least 80%, then
the applicant is classified as fully disabled and maximum benefits are paid. The claimant is
compensated, at least initially, for approximately 70% of lost earnings capacity.5
The benefit recipient is permitted to do paid work without the loss of benefits but only
4The threshold was increased to 35% in 2006 for new applicants. This change did not affect the DI recip-
ients we examine, who had all applied and were receiving DI before 2006. Neither did it affect reassessments
of the entitlement of these recipients conducted after 2006.
5Specifically, the replacement rate is set at 70% of the mid-point of each interval of the degree of
disability. The intervals are: [15%, 25%), [25%, 35%), [35%, 45%), [45%, 55%), [55%, 65%), [65%, 80%) and
[80%, 100%]. The replacement rate in the top interval is 70%. Those less than fully disabled receive this
earnings-related benefit for a limited period (6 years max). See Appendix A.1 for further details.
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up to the maximum earnings consistent with their assessed degree of disability. Earning
more than that results in downward revision of the degree of disability and a reduced benefit
payment. After leaving DI, benefits continue to be received during a three-month trial
period before entitlement is lost. Prior to the reform, outflow from DI was low. The degree
of disability was reassessed one year after a claim was awarded and every five years thereafter.
These reassessments were often based on no more than the recipient’s response to a postal
questionnaire.
2.2 The reform: reassessment under more stringent rules
From October 2004, the stock of DI recipients younger than 50 on July 1, 2004 became eligible
for reassessment under more stringent criteria.6 Reassessment had two components. First,
recipients were required to undergo a medical examination. The criteria used in this part
were the same as previously, and so it could result in revision of the recipient’s assessed func-
tional limitations only if their health condition was observed to have changed. Descriptive
analysis presented in Appendix A.2 suggests that this stage contributed rather substantially
to reducing benefit entitlements. Second, the degree of disability was re-calculated using
stricter rules that could result in upward revision of earnings capacity and downward re-
vision of pre-disability earnings (see Appendix A.2 for details). As a result, for any given
health condition and associated functional limitations, the degree of disability would either
be reduced or remain unchanged. Consequently, the benefit paid could be cut or terminated.
This intensified the reduction in entitlement through downward revision of the degree of dis-
ability that began with the 1993 reform evaluated by Borghans et al. (2014).
In 2007, strong criticism of the policy and a change of government resulted in the age
threshold for reassessment being revised from less than 50 to less than 45 on July 1, 2004. As
6Plans for the reform were announced in May 2003 and the reform was legislated in April 2004, with
the intention to start the reassessments from July 2004. Political opposition and lack of consensus about
the reassessment criteria resulted in implementation being pushed back to October 2004. Analysis in section
4.3 of trends in employment and earnings prior to the start of the reassessments does not reveal patterns
consistent with anticipation effects.
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a result, around 17,000 recipients aged 45-49 who had already been reassessed were assessed
once more under the old, more lenient rules (Ministry of Justice 2007).7 Consequently, we
restrict attention to benefit recipients aged 30-44 on July 1, 2004.
Among those DI recipients, about a quarter (24.4%) were reassessed as having a degree
of disability below the 15% minimum threshold and had their entitlement withdrawn com-
pletely. Almost half (47.9%) of those initially with the lowest degree of disability [15%, 25%)
were disqualified from receiving any benefit. Even among those who initially were classified
as fully disabled ([80%, 100%] interval), 17% were placed below the minimum threshold after
reassessment and lost their benefits entirely. About 10% of recipients aged 30-44 were allowed
to remain on DI but with lower benefits. Consequently, more than a third (34.4%) had their
benefits either cut or terminated. A majority (58.5%) experienced no change in their enti-
tlement. The initially fully disabled were least affected: 72% continued to received the same
amount of benefit.8 Despite the application of more stringent rules, 6% of recipients had
their degree of disability raised following reassessment because the medical reexamination
detected a deterioration in health and increased functional impairment since the previous
assessment.9
The consequences of the reform for benefit entitlement were clearly heterogeneous. Greater
downward revision to the degree of disability resulted in a larger reduction in benefits. We
are not estimating the effects of an across-the-board benefit cut. Rather, we estimate the
average effect of reassessment on benefit income, as well as the average effects on employ-
ment and earnings resulting from the targeted revisions to benefit entitlement. These effects
are obtained by averaging over all who were eligible for reassessment, a majority of whom
7Those aged 45-49 who were reassessed twice under different rules appear to be exceptional in the extent
to which their degree of disability was initially reduced (see Appendix A.4). This probably reflects targeting
for earlier reassessment those recipients who were expected to be most affected by it. It rules out using
differences in exposure to reassessment within this age group for identification.
8This group included some who were not called for medical examination because their full disability was
apparent from the seriousness of their condition identified on file. These case files were reviewed, however.
The reform involved reassessment of the degree of disability of all benefit recipients aged 30-44.
9See Appendix A.2 Table A.1 for detailed analysis of the changes in degree of disability resulting from
the reassessments.
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experienced no change in their benefit entitlement. The average effect will be much smaller
than the average reduction in benefits paid to those whose degree of disability was reduced
as a result of reassessment.
The reassessments were undertaken between October 2004 and April 2009. However,
very few (1.2%) were done in 2004, almost half (46%) were performed by the end of 2005,
more than four fifths (81%) had been undertaken by the end of 2006 and they were all but
completed (99.9%) by the end of 2008 (see Appendix A.3 Table A.2). Around 14% of those
who had been claiming DI in January 2004 and who were eligible by age for reassessment —
the two characteristics that define our treatment group — left the program before there was
an opportunity to reassess them. Since they may have exited in response to the prospect of
reassessment, we include these individuals in the treatment group used to estimate effects of
the reform.
Initially, the plan was to reassess all younger benefit recipients before moving to older
groups, but this was not observed. The order in which recipients were called for reassessment
was, however, far from random. It is correlated with the outcome of reassessment in a way
that suggests recipients who the agency expected would experience larger benefit cuts were
called earlier (see Appendix A.3). For this reason, we do not attempt to exploit variation in
the timing of reassessment for identification.
If the outcome of reassessment was a downward revision in the degree of disability, then
benefits were reduced or terminated two months later. If employment was not secured, a
disqualified DI recipient could transfer to unemployment insurance (UI) if still eligible for
that program. If not, or if UI entitlement would last for less than six months, then application
could be made to a temporary program put in place specifically to cushion the short term
impact of the reform. This maintained DI income at the same level for a period of six months
(increased to twelve months in 2007). Around 18% of recipients whose entitlements were
reduced or terminated were granted benefits from this program (Social Insurance Benefits
Agency (UWV) 2009).
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Further details of the implementation of the reform and the reassessment process are
given in Appendix A.
3 Identification & Estimation
3.1 Identification
We estimate effects of the reform, comprising reassessment of the stock of younger DI recip-
ients under more stringent rules, on benefit receipt and labor supply. To estimate average
effects on recipients aged 30-44, we need a comparison group that allows credible identifica-
tion of the average outcomes that would have materialized in the target group if the reform
had not been implemented.





potential outcomes with and without being targeted for reassessment respectively. Let t=0
indicate some time before the commencement of reassessments, such that Yi0 = Y
0
i0 ∀i. In
our main analysis, we use annual data and t=0 corresponds to 2004. This introduces a slight
inaccuracy since around 1% of recipients aged 30-44 were reassessed in the last quarter of
2004 (Appendix Table A.2). We test robustness to using monthly data, which avoids this
inaccuracy, in section 5.3.10 Let t=4 be four years later in 2008 when the reassessments were
completed (but for a negligible < 0.001%). Then, Yi4 = DiY
1
i4 + (1 −Di)Y 0i4, where Di = 1
if i has been targeted for reassessment and is 0 otherwise. We wish to estimate the average
effect of the reform on those targeted for reassessment: ATET = E [Y 1i4 − Y 0i4 | Di = 1].11
10We do not use monthly data throughout because they are more noisy and the dataset becomes extremely
large, which slows computation considerably on the remote server through which the administrative files are
accessed.
11We take 2008 as the endpoint because of a data constraint explained below. This risks not capturing
the full effect on the 2.9% who were reassessed during 2008. Since most of them were reassessed at the
beginning of 2008, and also because they had longer to prepare for reassessment and so may have responded
more quickly, any downward bias should be modest. We define treatment to include those who left DI before
they could be reassessed since leaving DI may have been a response to the prospect of reassessment. It
should be kept in mind that the target group had warning of this prospect and this may have influenced the
effect of the reform.
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One potential identification strategy would rely on a difference-in-differences (DID) com-
parison between younger benefit recipients (30-44 on July 1, 2004) who were subject to
reassessment and older recipients (50+ on July 1, 2004) who were not.12 This is likely to be
problematic since older DI beneficiaries have a lower probability of returning to work and
recovering their earnings than younger recipients, even when the latter are not subject to
reassessment. An alternative comparison group would be DI recipients who are the same
age as those targeted by the reform but who are observed in a period that ends before the
reassessments begin. The threat to a DID strategy using this comparison group comes from
period-specific labor market conditions and any earlier changes in DI that would invalidate
using the earlier period to identify counterfactual employment and earnings of the target age
group in the reform period.
Our strategy makes use of both comparison groups – older benefit recipients in the
same period and recipients of the same age in an earlier period – to identify the impact of
reassessment under an assumption that is plausibly (although not necessarily) weaker than
each assumption required to construct the counterfactual from one of the two comparison
groups alone. We use a four-year interval running from 1999 to 2003 (PERIODi = 0)
that precedes the reform to identify the extent to which the trend in the average outcome of
younger DI recipients aged 30-44 (AGEi = 1) differs from the trend of older recipients, whom
we define as aged from 50 to 53 (AGEi = 0). Effectively, we subtract the age-differential trend
in the non-reform period from the age group DID over the four-year reform period running
from 2004 to 2008 (PERIODi = 1) during which the younger age group was reassessed.
This differential trend adjusted difference-in-differences (DADID) (Bell et al. 1999; Blundell
and Costa Dias 2002) relaxes the assumption of common trends in earnings (/employment)
across age groups in the absence of the reform. It also avoids assuming that the change in
earnings in the 30-44 age group would have been the same in the two periods if there had
12Those aged 45-49 on July 1, 2004 are not useful either as a treatment group or a comparison group
since some of them were first reassessed under the new, stricter rules and then (after 2007) assessed once
again under the initial, more lenient rules.
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been no reform in the later period. The assumption that is required for identification of
the ATET by DADID is that the age differential in the trends in earnings would have been
common across periods in the absence of the reform:
E
[












Y 0i4 − Y 0i0 | AGEi = 0, PERIODi = 0
] (1)
We assess the plausibility of this assumption in section 4.3 by comparing age differences
in trends across periods in which there was no reform. If the assumption holds, then any
widening of the age differential in the trends that occurs in the reform period relative to the
non-reform period can be attributed to a positive impact of reassessment on the earnings of
younger benefit recipients. The average effect of the reform on those targeted for reassessment
is then given by the DADID:
E
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Yi0 | AGEi = 0, PERIODi = 0
])}
(2)
If the reform was anticipated by benefit recipients who reacted by leaving DI and entering
employment already in 2004, then our strategy will deliver lower bound estimates of the
effect.13 But the pre-reform trends presented in section 4.3 do not reveal patterns consistent
with anticipation. If the effect of the reform were to have spilled over to reduce the labor
market activity of the older group, possibly through intensified job competition from the
younger, targeted group or because implementation of the reform diverted the benefits agency
from conducting periodic, standard reassessments of the older group, then the magnitudes of
13The planned reform was initially announced in May 2003, and so it is possible that it was anticipated
by those aged 30-44 in our non-reform period cohort, as well as those of the same age in the reform period
cohort. If there were behavioral responses to any such anticipation already in 2003 in either or both cohorts
aged 30-44, then our DADID estimates of effect magnitudes will be downwardly biased.
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our estimates would be upwardly biased. However, the risk of spillover bias is substantially
reduced by the very low rate of exit of the older group from DI (around 5%) even in normal
times. A six year age gap between the two groups further reduces the risk. If the bias were
present, it would be evident from the older group’s outcome trends in the reform period
diverging from those in the non-reform period, which is not the case (see Appendix B Figure
B1). While we cannot rule out spillover bias entirely, the context and descriptives suggest
that it is unlikely to be anything other than negligible. In section 5.2, we further assess
the credibility of the strategy by checking that it gives a zero “effect” on the earnings of
individuals who were not DI recipients and so were not exposed to the reform.
3.2 Estimation
To estimate the effects, we pool two 5-year balanced panels of DI recipients from the reform
period (2004-2008) and the non-reform period (1999-2003). At entry to the panel, which is
January 1, 2004 and January 1, 1999 for the reform and non-reform periods respectively,
every observation is receiving DI benefits. In the reform period panel, the treated recipients
are aged 30-44 on July 1, 2004. The comparison group obtained from this panel is aged
50-53 on July 1, 2004. We choose this age range in order to obtain a comparison group
that is sufficiently large while remaining reasonably close to the treatment group in age,
which makes the identification assumption more credible. In section 5.3, we demonstrate
robustness to using narrower and wider age intervals to define the comparison group. In the
non-reform period panel, we distinguish between those aged 30-44 and those aged 50-53 on
July 1, 1999.





βtAGEi × PERIODi × Y EARt + θtY EARt
+γtAGEi × Y EARt + δtPERIODi × Y EARt
)
+ µi + εit,
(3)
where Y EARt, t = 0, 1, ..4 is an indicator of the within panel year of the observation, such
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that Y EAR0 = 1 & PERIODi = 1 indicates 2004, Y EAR0 = 1 & PERIODi = 0 indicates
1999, Y EAR1 = 1 & PERIODi = 1 indicates 2005 and Y EAR4 = 1 indicates 2008 or 2003
depending on the value of PERIODi, µi is an individual fixed effect and εit is an idiosyncratic
error. In addition to period effects and age effects that differ between the periods, both of
which are captured by the fixed effects, this model allows within panel time effects (θt) that
differ across age groups (γt) and periods (δt). The period-specific level effects and trends
allow for the fact that the periods 1999-2003 and 2004-2008 span different phases of the
business cycle. Growth was decelerating in the earlier period and accelerating in the later
period. The age-specific trends allow for the possibility that, within each period, average
earnings (employment) of the younger group of DI recipients does not move in parallel to
that of the older group.
Subject to the identification assumption (1), βt corresponds to the average effect of the
reform t years after reassessments started to be implemented. Prior to t = 4, corresponding
to 2008 in the reform period, the effects are not so interesting since not all benefit recipients
in the target group aged 30-44 had been reassessed before then (Appendix A.3 Table A.2).
We focus on the estimate of β4, which corresponds to the ATET of the reassessment reform.
Note that we are estimating the effect of the reassessment reform, not of the reduction in
benefits that is the consequence of some, but not all, reassessments. By estimating the effect
on benefits received, as well as on earnings (and employment), we can assess the extent
to which earnings capacity was revised upwards, and we can examine the responsiveness
of earnings (employment) to reduced benefit entitlement. We cannot estimate effects after
2008 because this would require extending the length of the non-reform period, which is
impossible since data are not available before 1999 and the reform period begins after 2003.
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4 Data
4.1 Sources and measures
We obtain data on all recipients of DI benefits from social security files, which record degree of
disability, benefit amount, claim duration and main diagnosis. We use these data to estimate
the effect of the reform on the probability of receiving DI and the (annual) amount received.
Diagnosis recorded on entry to DI is used to distinguish claimants in the two diagnostic
groups that include the most subjectively defined disabilities - musculoskeletal conditions
and mental disorders.14 We lump all other disabilities together. The social security files
are also used to identify benefits received from other social insurance and social assistance
programs, which we aggregate to obtain annual net of tax income from social transfers other
than DI.
Data on employment, days worked and annual earnings (net of tax) are taken from
files (polisadministratie) maintained by the Social Insurance Benefits Agency (UWV) that
contain information related to income sources subject to earnings tax. We count a person
as employed if registered as an employee for at least one day in a calendar year.15
Municipal registers are used to identify date of birth and gender. Deaths are identified
from the mortality register. The administrative files are linked using a unique individual
identification number (RIN-code) that is issued on compulsory registration with the munic-
ipality at birth or after immigration. Additional details of the data sources and measures
are provided in Appendix B Table B1.
14The classification uses the most aggregated level of the International Classification of Diseases version
9.
15The estimated effect on employment is highly robust to defining employment as being in paid work for
a minimum of a week, a month and a quarter, as opposed to a day (see Appendix C Table C7).
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4.2 Treatment and comparison groups
To construct the reform period sample, we select individuals who were claiming DI in January
2004. Of these, 3.9% died before the end of 2008 and are dropped from the panel. Mortality
obviously differs between the age groups. But the age differential in mortality rates does
not differ between the reform and non-reform periods. Hence, conditioning on survival does
not introduce any compositional change that would bias the DADID estimates. We drop
benefit recipients aged 45-49 on July 1, 2004 because of their inconsistent exposure to the
reform that we described above.16 We also exclude recipients younger than 30 because
there are very few of them and they typically have had little employment experience. Their
employment patterns are likely to differ markedly from the older claimants we use as one
comparison group. This leaves a treatment group of 160,194 individuals who were claiming
DI in January 2004, were aged 30-44 on July 1, 2004 and so were eligible for reassessment
and could be followed to the end of 2008 when the reassessments were completed. The
group includes 22,380 individuals who left DI before the agency managed to reassess their
eligibility. Since these exits may have been in anticipation of the outcome of reassessment,
these individuals can be considered to have been exposed to the reform and are appropriately
part of the treatment group.
One of our comparison groups comprises 94,404 individuals who were claiming DI in
January 2004, were aged 50-53 on July 1, 2004 and so were not subject to reassessment. The
non-reform period sample consists of individuals who were claiming DI in January 1999,
were aged either 30-44 (as the treatment group, 139,524 individuals) or 50-53 (as reform
period comparison group, 102,464 individuals) on July 1, 1999, and survived to the end of
2003. We pool this balanced panel spanning the years 1999-2003 with that constructed for
16DADID estimates of the effects of the reform on individuals aged 45-49 are given in Appendix C.1,
Table C1. As expected given this group’s diluted exposure to the reform, the effects on the receipt of DI,
employment and earnings are all the same sign but considerably smaller in magnitude compared with those
for the 30-44 age group presented in Table 2. The effect on the benefit amount received by those aged 45-49
is positive (in 2008). This surprising result is likely due to compensation paid to recipients who had their
benefits cut temporarily (see Appendix C.1).
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the reform period, 2004-2008.
Table 1 shows means of characteristics at selection into the samples, i.e. 1999 and 2004,
by age group and period. In both age groups, there is a higher fraction of females in the
later period. This partly reflects increasing labor force participation of Dutch women and is
consistent with the feminization of DI rolls observed in other countries. More relevant to the
plausibility of our identification strategy is that the age group difference in the proportion
of female benefit recipients is roughly constant across the two periods. The same is true
with respect to the average duration of a DI claim and the amount received. There is a
discernible age group difference in the proportion of fully disabled claimants only in the
earlier, non-reform period. Related to this, only in this period does the employment rate
differ across the age groups, with the older benefit recipients being less likely to work (and
more likely to be fully disabled). Consequently, the age difference in mean earnings is in the
opposite direction in the two periods. These period differences in the gaps in the levels of
employment and earnings between the age groups do not invalidate the DADID identification
strategy. We examine whether there is any sign of the age-specific trends diverging up to
the implementation of the reform in the next sub-section.
For both age groups, mean incomes from social transfer programs other than DI are
higher at the start of the reform period than at the start of the non-reform period, and the
age gap is somewhat wider in the reform period. The increase over time may well be due
to the rise in the proportion of benefit recipients with mental health problems, who tend
to be more heavily dependent on welfare. Combined with recipients with musculoskeletal
conditions, they are the majority in all age groups and periods, and more so in the later
period. In the earlier period, there is no age difference in the fraction of recipients with either
of these two more subjectively defined conditions. But in the later reform period, recipients
in the younger group are more likely to have these diagnoses. This gives further reason to
perform disaggregated analysis by diagnosis.
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Table 1: Characteristics of DI recipients by period and age - Means at sample entry
Reform period Non-reform period
Age 30-44 Age 50-53 Age 30-44 Age 50-53
Demographics
Female (%) 60.3 45.7 53.4 37.4
Age (years) 38.7 52.1 38.8 52.1
Disability insurance
Benefit amount (e/year) 8,422 9,950 8,559 10,634
Fully disabled (%) 63.5 64.0 65.4 69.4
Claim duration (years) 5.44 9.52 5.90 9.96
Labor market
Employed (%) 35.9 35.8 40.7 34.6
Earnings (e/year) 4,207 5,162 4,947 4,879
Other social transfers
Benefit amount (e/year) 1,043 726 724 555
Diagnosis
Mental disorders (%) 43.1 33.8 34.4 27.9
Musculoskeletal (%) 28.9 32.9 25.0 31.2
Other disabilities (%) 28.0 33.3 40.6 40.9
Number of individuals 160,194 94,404 139,524 102,464
Note: The Reform period panel refers to DI benefit recipients selected in January 2004. The Non-reform
period panel refers to those selected in January 1999. Columns within each panel are split by age on July 1,
2004 (Reform period) and July 1, 1999 (Non-reform period). The first column in the Reform period panel
corresponds to the treatment group. All others are for comparison groups. Earnings and benefit amounts
are annual, net of taxes and inflated to 2015 price levels (Eurostat Netherlands HCPI 2015).
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4.3 Trends
Figure 1 shows difference-in-differences in receipt of any DI benefits, employment and labor
earnings between the two age groups within each period.17 These figures are drawn using
monthly data to allow more detailed assessment of the evolution of the trends before and
after the start of the reassessments. Each line traces the age group difference (30-44 years
- 50-53 years) in the deviation of the respective outcome from its value in month 0, which
is October 2004 in the reform period, when reassessments started, and October 1999 in the
non-reform period. After month 0, the difference in the DID between the periods corresponds
to the DADID and gives an initial impression of the impact of the reform.
Consistent with the identification assumption, prior to month 0 the age group difference
in the trend of each outcome is very similar across the two periods. In fact, up to month 5, i.e.
five months after reassessments started in the reform period when only 8% of claimants aged
30-44 had been reassessed, there is little sign of the age differential in the trends differing
across the periods. After that point, when the pace of reassessments picked up in the reform
period, the age differentials begin to diverge more markedly across the periods. This is
consistent with the application of more stringent eligibility criteria to ever greater numbers
of younger benefit recipients in the reform period having raised the rate at which they exited
DI relative to older recipients, and with relative increases in the employment and earnings
of younger recipients who either left DI or remained on the program despite experiencing a
cut in their benefits.
Attribution of the differential trends across periods that are evident in Figure 1 to the
reform rests on assumption (1) - the age differential in the outcome trend would have been
common across periods in the absence of the reform. It is difficult to gauge the plausibility
of this assumption from comparison of the outcome trends over two periods of only nine
months (Jan.-Sept. 1999 and Jan.-Sept. 2004). To better assess whether the assumption is
17See Appendix B Figure B1 for plots of the raw trends in the outcomes for the two age-groups separately
in the two periods.
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Figure 1: Age group difference-in-differences in outcomes by period
A: Disability Insurance (pp) B: Employment (pp)
C: Labor earnings (e/year)
Note: Reform period (Jan. 2004-Dec. 2008) sample consists of individuals aged 30-44 & 50-53 on July 1,
2004 who were claiming DI in January 2004. Non-reform period (Jan. 1999-Dec. 2003) sample consists of
individuals aged 30-44 &50-53 on July 1, 1999 who were claiming DI in January 1999. Month 0 is October
2004 for reform period and October 1999 for non-reform period. Each line traces a period-specific difference-
in-differences: the mean outcome at month t minus the mean outcome at month 0 for the 30-44 age group
less the respective difference for the 50-53 age group. Disability Insurance is an indicator of receipt of any
DI benefits. Group sizes are given in Table 1. pp = percentage points.
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credible, we show in Figure 2 two different cohorts of DI recipients traced over 21 months
prior to the start of reassessments in the reform period.18 The age differentials in the outcome
trends do not diverge markedly between the two cohorts over this extended time span before
reassessments started. This is slightly less true for the receipt of DI benefits than it is for
the other two outcomes. Apparently, even before the start of reassessments in the reform
period sample, younger claimants in this cohort were exiting DI at a faster rate relative
to older claimants than was the case in the earlier period sample. While this would be
consistent with recipients in the later period leaving the program in anticipation of negative
reassessments, this seems unlikely given there is no sign of a similar pre-reform divergence in
the employment trends. Someone who anticipated that their DI benefits would be terminated
or cut would have no incentive to leave the program before this occurred, unless they had
found employment. There is a clear downward kink in the differential trend in receipt of DI in
the reform period sample coincident with the acceleration in the reassessments from around
month 5 and no such kink in the non-reform period sample. The size of this divergence
relative to the prior differential trend suggests that while the DADID may overestimate the
impact of the reform on the DI exit rate, the upward bias is likely to be small. Further, the
similarity of the trends in employment and earnings prior to month 0 across periods supports
the validity of the DADID identification assumption for these outcomes.
18One of these cohorts consists of individuals who were a) receiving DI in January 2003, b) aged 30-44
or 50-53 on July 1, 2004, and c) observable until December 2006. Those in the younger group of this cohort
were subject to reassessment from October 2004, provided they were still on DI at that time. They are
observed for 21 months prior to this date. The second cohort is defined exactly as the non-reform period
groups we use for estimation except that the age criteria are applied on July 1, 2000 (rather than July 1,
1999) and we follow them only until December 2002. The pseudo reform period for this cohort is set as
starting in October 2000.
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Figure 2: Age group difference-in-differences in outcomes by period
- extended duration prior to (pseudo) reform
A: Disability Insurance (pp) B: Employment (pp)
C: Labor earnings (e/year)
Note: Reform period (Jan. 2003-Dec. 2006) sample consists of individuals aged 30-44 & 50-53 on July 1,
2004 who were claiming DI in January 2003. Non-reform period (Jan. 1999-Dec. 2002) sample consists of
individuals aged 30-44 & 50-53 on July 1, 1999 who were claiming DI in January 2000. Month 0 is October
2004 for reform period and October 2000 for non-reform period. Sample sizes are 140,283 for the non-reform
period sample claimants aged 30-44, and 103,490 for those in the same period aged 50-53. In the reform




Column (1) of Table 2 gives the estimate of β4 from a least squares regression of the form
(3) for each outcome. Each column entry is a DADID estimate of the ATET - the ef-
fect of the reform on the respective outcome in 2008 averaged over all individuals who
were aged 30-44 and claiming DI in 2004. By 2008, these individuals had been subjected
to reassessment under the more stringent criteria.19 The middle column gives the treat-




i (AGEi × PERIODi × Y EAR4) Ŷit− β̂4, where Ŷit is the predicted outcome from (3)
and nT is the number of individuals in the treatment group. Column (3) gives effects on
labor market outcomes and other social transfer income scaled by the estimated effect on
DI income, which facilitates comparison of the sizes of the responses induced by the 2004
Dutch reform with those generated by other policies that lead to changes in DI benefits.20
We estimate that reassessment reduced the probability of remaining on DI in 2008 by
14.4 percentage points.21 This includes the direct effect of claims terminated through ap-
plication of the stricter rules as well as any indirect effect that may arise through reduced
benefits inducing some to leave DI. Using the regression estimates, we predict that 84.5%
of individuals aged 30-44 who had been claiming DI in 2004 would still have been on the
19The estimated effects in all the post-reform years are given in Appendix C.2 Table C2. The effects
increase in magnitude with time since the start of the reform period, which reflects the growing number of
recipients who are reassessed.
20We refer to these as “scaled effects”, rather than instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the response
of labor outcomes to DI benefits, for three reasons. First, it is possible that reassessment could impact
on labor activity other than through benefit entitlement, and so the exclusion restriction could be violated.
Second, the estimated reduction in benefits is the combined effect of cuts and responses to those cuts through
claimants leaving DI because it has become less generous. Third, reassessment resulted in benefit entitlement
rising for some recipients whose health had deteriorated sufficiently to offset the effect of increased stringency.
Hence, monotonicity does not hold.
21This is somewhat larger than an estimate obtained by taking the difference between the reform period
and non-reform period difference-in-differences at the extreme right of panel A of Figure 1. Employment
and earnings effects estimates in Table 2 are also a little larger than those inferred from panels B and C
respectively of Figure 1. The reason is that Figure 1 is drawn using monthly data, while the Table 2 estimates
are obtained from yearly data. Robustness to using monthly data is assessed in Table 3, Panel D.
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DI roll in 2008 if there had been no tightening of the rules. This implies that reassessment
with stricter criteria reduced the probability of continued receipt of DI by 17% of what it
otherwise would have been. It raised the DI exit rate by 93%.
On average, reassessment is estimated to have reduced the annual amount of DI benefit
received by e1565, or around one fifth of the average amount under the counterfactual.22
Given that the degree of disability did not change as a result of reassessment for a majority
and it even increased for a few (Appendix A.2 Table A.1), this average grossly understates
the average reduction in benefits experienced by the 34% for whom the outcome of reassess-
ment was negative. To estimate this reduction, we need to make an assumption about its
magnitude relative to the size of the effect on the small proportion who had their degree
of disability raised following medical reexamination (due to health deterioration) despite
application of more stringent rules.23 If the magnitudes of the two effects were equal, then
the average benefit reduction of e1565 over all those reassessed would imply an average
reduction of e5530 among those whose benefits were cut. This is probably an overestimate.
But even if we assume that there was no effect on the 6% whose degree of disability was
raised, then the average effect on the 34% whose benefits were cut would still be a substantial
e4549.24 This is 54% of the mean benefit income received by the treatment group prior to
the reform.
22We estimate that reform reduced the rate at which DI income replaced pre-disability earnings by 7.2
percentage points from a replacement rate under the counterfactual of 46 percent. To obtain these estimates,
we average the replacement rate over the whole treatment group and set it to zero for those who had left DI
by 2008.
23We can write the ATET as a weighted average of the effects on the sub-groups that have their ben-
efits cut and raised: ATET = pcATETc + prATETr, where ATETc = E
[





Y 1i4 − Y 0i4 | Di = 1, Y 1i4 > Y 0i4
]










and pr is the proportion for whom benefits are raised. Let −ATETr = kATETc, then
ATETc =
ATET
pc−kpr . We assume the average treatment effect is zero for recipients whose degree of disability
remained the same after reassessment.
24There are two reasons to expect the magnitude of any effect on recipients who had their degree of
disability (DD) increased to be small, possibly zero, and, in any case, substantially smaller than the effect
on those whose DD was reduced. First, any increase in benefit entitlement due to health deterioration
would be (partially) offset by using more stringent rules to calculate DD. Second, target group recipients
with deteriorating health, along with equivalent cases in the comparison groups, may have been detected
eventually by the periodic reassessments that were conducted prior to the 2004 reform. Then, subject to our
identification assumption, the empirical strategy would give a zero effect on these recipients.
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Table 2: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules
Effect Predicted mean Effect scaled by




Benefit Receipt (pp) -14.40*** 84.52 NA
(0.20)
Benefit Amount (e/year) -1,565*** 7,906 NA
(47.60)
Labor Market
Employment (pp) 6.68*** 33.83 4.27
(0.25)
Days worked (year) 17.03*** 76.26 10.88
(0.68)
Earnings (e/year) 995*** 5,507 635.8
(43.19)
Other social transfers
Benefit amount (e/year) 376*** 877 240.3
(17.73)
Number of individuals 496,586
Number of observations 2,482,930
Notes: Column (1) gives least squares estimates of β4 from (3). Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level. Column (2) gives predicted mean outcome of 30-44 age group in 2008
under counterfactual of no reform, i.e. 1nT
∑
i (AGEi × PERIODi × Y EAR4) Ŷit − β̂4, where Ŷit is the
predicted outcome from (3) and nT is the number of individuals in the treatment group. Columns (3) gives
column (1) estimate divided by the absolute value of the estimated effect on the benefit amount in e’000s
(from 2nd row of column (1)). The number of individuals is the total across all treatment and comparison
groups. For the numbers in each group, see Table 1. pp = percentage points. *** indicates significance at
the 1% level.
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Having established that the reform reduced DI entitlement, we now turn to the question
of central interest: what impact did this increased stringency have on employment and earn-
ings? We estimate that reassessment raised the probability of employment by 6.7 percentage
points, which is a 20% increase relative to the predicted employment rate in the absence of
the reform and corresponds to a 4.3 point rise in employment set against a e1000 loss in
annual income received from DI (Table 2).25
Borghans et al. (2014) estimate that a less stringent tightening of the Dutch DI program
in 1993 increased employment by 2.9 points. In absolute terms, this is less than half the size
of the effect we find on employment. But it is larger relative to their estimated 3.8 percentage
points reduction in the probability of receiving DI. The implied lower rate of absorption of
displaced claimants into employment from the later reform we evaluate is consistent with
an expected decrease in the work capacity of claimants as the process of DI retrenchment
proceeds. Moore (2015) finds that 22 percent of US SSDI recipients whose benefits were
terminated entered employment. Relative to a 100 percent loss of benefit entitlement, this
is a much smaller employment response than we find.26
We estimate that greater benefit stringency increased the number of days worked annu-
ally by 17; equivalent to 22% of the predicted mean for the treatment group in the absence
of the reform. The extensive and intensive margin effects on labor supply produced an esti-
mated e995 average increase in the annual earnings of DI claimants whose entitlement was
reassessed. This is an 18% increase relative to predicted earnings under the counterfactual.
It is almost two thirds of the estimated average reduction in the benefits received. From
each e1000 reduction in DI benefit received, e636 could be regained through labor market
earnings.27 This is very close to the e618 estimated by Borghans et al.. The recovery of
25We estimate that the probability of working and not claiming DI was increased by 8.5 points (SE=0.18,
p-value<0.01). Given this is larger than the effect on the unconditional probability of employment, re-
assessment reduced the likelihood of claiming DI and working (by 1.8 points). This is likely due to initially
partially disabled working claimants being forced or induced to leave the program.
26Besides the addictive behavior of those targeted by the reform evaluated by Moore, the difference could
partly arise from incentives for disqualified US claimants to stay out of work in order to strengthen their
case at reapplication. There is no such incentive in the Dutch system.
27Bearing in mind that the estimated reduction in DI benefits arises not only directly from cuts imposed
25
two-thirds of lost benefit income through increased earnings is double the rate managed by
the US 18-year-olds who lost their DI entitlement studied by Deshpande (2016). In the
Netherlands, even after the 1993 reduction in entitlement, some DI recipients subjected to
reassessment in 2004 still had considerable earnings potential they could be induced to utilize
to replace a substantial part of the benefits lost due to the increased program stringency.
This is even more striking considering that those affected had been claiming DI for more
than five years, on average, and 63% were classified as fully disabled (see Table 1).
It bears emphasis that these are average effects and reassessment resulted in the reduction
or termination of benefits for a little more than one third of recipients (Appendix A.2 Table
A.1). If we assume that reassessment did not have any impact on earnings other than through
benefit entitlement and it had no effect on the earnings of the 6% whose degree of disability
was raised, then an average increase in earnings of e995 over all those reassessed implies
an average increase of e2892 over all those who had their benefits cut.28 This is 69% of
the average annual earnings of the whole treatment group prior to the reform and is a 53%
increase on the predicted mean earnings in 2008 if there had been no reform. These large
average effects do not, however, reflect the predicament of claimants negatively impacted by
reassessment who could not increase their earnings to an extent anywhere near sufficient to
achieve the average 64% replacement of lost benefit income.
We estimate that reduced DI entitlement increased the amount received from other social
after reassessment but also indirectly from decisions to leave DI that has become less generous, the ratio of
the estimated effects on earnings and benefit income cannot be interpreted as an unbiased estimate of the
rate at which earnings are crowded out by each e1 of DI benefit. However, we can infer that the rate of
crowd-out is at least as high as 0.64:1, since the average imposed cut in benefits will be less than the average
reduction in benefits received.
28In addition to the reasons given in footnote 24 for expecting the magnitude of any effect on the benefit
entitlement of recipients whose degree of disability (DD) was increased to be small, and possibly zero, the
effect on their earnings would be even smaller relative to that on those whose DD was reduced if, as seems
likely, the earnings response to a benefit increase (due to worsening health) is smaller than that due to a
benefit reduction (with constant health). Using the formula given in footnote 23, if we assume the earnings
effect on those whose DD was raised is one tenth of the size of the effect on those whose DD was reduced,
then the average earnings effect on the latter group would be e2944. If we assume equal but opposite effects
on the two groups, then the effect on those whose benefits were cut would be e3516. In any case, the effect
on those who experienced a cut in benefits appears to have been substantial.
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transfers by e376, on average (Table 2).29 This is 24% of the average reduction in income
received from DI. The respective estimate from Borghans et al. (2014) is 30%. Apparently,
opportunities to substitute between programs decreased in the decade between the reforms
evaluated, but not markedly. Summing the average effects on earnings and other social
transfer income gives a total of e1371, which is about 88% of the estimated average reduction
in payments received from DI.
5.2 Placebo test
The validity of our empirical strategy rests on the assumption that the age differential in the
outcome trends that would have materialized between 2004 and 2008 in the absence of the
DI reform is that which occurred between 1999 and 2003. To further assess the plausibility
of this assumption, we perform a placebo test by estimating the DADID in outcomes of
individuals who were not recipients of DI benefits but who were potentially affected, possibly
differentially by age, by differences in labor market conditions across the two periods. Placebo
treatment and comparison groups are defined by age and period analogous to those used
to estimate the effect of the reform. The difference is that we only use individuals who
did not claim DI at any time between January 2004 and December 2008, and in the non-
reform period between January 1999 and December 2003. We exclude individuals who were
claiming unemployment insurance in 1999 (for non-reform period groups) or 2004 (for reform
period groups) because the DI reform could potentially have affected their labor market
opportunities by increasing the supply of labor from DI claimants. We use a random 50%
sample of the 6.7 million individuals available for analysis.
We get precisely estimated zero “effects” on earnings and days worked (see Appendix C.3
Table C4). There is a small, but statistically significant, negative “effect” on employment.30
29Around half of the spillover to other programs was to unemployment insurance (UI) (Appendix C.2
Table C3). Those deemed ineligible for DI were automatically transferred to UI if they had made sufficient
social insurance contributions prior to entering DI.
30The direction of this effect may seem puzzling given that macroeconomic conditions were better in
2004-2008 than they were in 1999-2003. The explanation is that it is an age difference in the period effect
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Significance may simply be attributable to the huge sample. The point estimate suggests
that employment of individuals aged 30-44 who were not recipients of DI fell by only 0.8%
of what it would have been in 2008 if the age differential in the employment trends between
2004 and 2008 had been the same as that observed between 1999 and 2003. Under the same
assumption, we estimate that the DI reform raised employment of DI recipients aged 30-44
by 20%. Hence, if anything, we may be slightly underestimating the impact on employment.
But the placebo test suggests that any such bias is marginal, and it gives no reason to doubt
the validity of the identification with respect to the effects on the other two labor market
outcomes.
5.3 Robustness
The placebo test indicates little or no bias arising from differences in labor market conditions
across the two periods that may have affected age groups differently. A second potential
threat to the identification would be any change in DI prior to the 2004 reform that had a
different impact on older and younger benefit recipients. One change that occurred within the
estimation periods was the introduction of the so-called Gatekeeper Protocol (GP) in 2002.
This made the employer and the employee jointly responsible for taking active measures to
enable the latter to continue working. It is credited with substantial reductions in the rate
of DI inflow (De Jong et al. 2011; Koning and Lindeboom 2015; Van Sonsbeek and Gradus
2012). Any impact on the exit rate, as well as on the employment and earnings of those
already receiving DI, would be indirect, and would not necessarily differ by age. Nonetheless,
we test whether the GP may be confounding our estimates by dropping all DI recipients who
had been claiming for 12 months or less at the time of selection into the reform period —
who were potentially impacted by the GP — and drop the equivalent recipients from the
non-reform period panel.31
on the trend, not simply a period effect. See Appendix C.3 for further explanation.
31The GP reform affected claimants who entered DI in January 2003 and later. It is irrelevant to our
non-reform period sample, who are selected from the stock of DI recipients in January 1999, and to all in
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The estimated effects on DI benefit amount and employment given in panel B of Table
3 are very close to the respective estimates obtained from our main design, which are re-
produced in panel A. The effect on the probability of receiving DI is about two percentage
points smaller than the main estimate and the effect on earnings is about one fifth smaller.
With this restriction on the samples, we estimate that reassessment that resulted in a loss
of benefit income of e1000 would raise earnings by e534, compared with a main estimate of
e636. These differences could indicate some upward bias in the earnings effect of the 2004
reform arising from changes in the composition of the stock of DI recipients brought about
by the GP. But they could also reflect heterogeneity in the response to the reform by claim
duration, which we explore in section 5.4. In any case, the main conclusion is that it does
not appear that the GP, rather than the 2004 reform, is driving our results.
Our choice of the 50-53 age range to define the older comparison group is motivated
by a compromise between keeping reasonably close to the age of the treatment group and
obtaining a large sample (for heterogeneity analysis). Panel C of Table 3 provides estimates
using narrower and wider age intervals to select the comparison group. They are very similar
to the main estimates. As acknowledged in section 3, using annual data and taking differences
from 2004 introduces a slight inaccuracy because 1% of reassessments were carried in the
last quarter of that year. Given this fraction is very small and, in any case, there was a
lag of a few months between reassessment and benefit cuts taking effect, this is unlikely to
cause any bias that is not negligible. However, while effectively all recipients aged 30-44 had
been reassessed by the end of 2008, around 3% were reassessed during that year (Appendix
A.2 Table A.2). The full effect of reassessment on these recipients may not be reflected
in earnings averaged over 2008. To allow for both inaccuracies, we test robustness to using
monthly data that allow us to take differences between September 2004 and December 2008.32
the reform period sample except those with a claim duration of 12 months or less in January 2004, when we
select this sample from the stock of DI recipients.
32See footnote 10 for the reasons monthly data are not used to obtain the main estimates. We cannot
estimate effects after December 2008 since this would require extending the length of the non-reform period,
which cannot start before January 1999 due to data not being available. If the non-reform period where
extended in the other direction, then the younger comparison group would then become exposed to the
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Table 3: Robustness to alternative sample selections and use of monthly data
Disability Insurance Labor Market
Benefit Receipt Benefit Amount Employment (pp) Earnings (e/year)
(pp) (e/year) Effect Scaled effect Effect Scaled effect
(1) (2) (3) (3)/|(2)| × 1000 (5) (5)/|(2)| × 1000
A. Main estimates
-14.40*** -1,565*** 6.68*** 4.27 995*** 636
(0.17) (31.7) (0.22) (43.2)
B. Drop those with claim duration ≤ 12 months
-12.50*** -1,504*** 6.85*** 4.55 803*** 534
(0.20) (33.5) (0.25) (53.7)
C. Define comparison group by other ages
Ages 50 to 52 -14.20*** -1,615*** 6.90*** 4.27 968*** 599
(0.21) (39.7) (0.27) (58.1)
Ages 50 to 54 -14.10*** -1,584*** 7.03*** 4.44 990*** 625
(0.19) (33.4) (0.24) (49.8)
D. Use monthly data
-11.57*** -1,521*** 4.17*** 3.73 784*** 515
(0.37) (65.2) (0.46) (93.1)
Notes: Panel A reproduces the main estimates from Table 2 obtained using annual data on the stock of
recipients in January 2004 (reform period) and January 1999 (non-reform period) with the older comparison
group defined by the age interval 50-53. Panel B removes recipients with a claim duration of 12 months or
less at entry to the panels. Panel C redefines the older comparison group by the age intervals 50-52 (top row)
and 50-54 (bottom row). Panel D estimates are obtained using monthly data. In this case, differences are
taken relative to September 2004 (in reform period) and estimated effects at December 2008 are presented.
Sample sizes (number of individuals): Panels A & D = 496,586, Panel B = 447,5443, Panel C (top row)=
443,196, Panel B (bottom row)=525,957. To get number of observations, multiply number of individuals by
5 for Panels A-C and by 60 for Panel D. For other details see Notes to Table 2.
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The estimates obtained (Table 3, Panel D) are somewhat smaller than the main estimates,
which is inconsistent with the latter not capturing the full effects of the reform. The effect
on receipt of DI is 2.8 percentage points smaller than the main estimate and employment
effect is 1.5 points smaller, while the estimated effect on earnings is e210 smaller. But, as
with the results of the other robustness analyses, these differences do not change the general
conclusions that reassessment resulted in substantial reductions in DI benefits, and both
employment and earnings increased markedly to compensate.
5.4 Effects by duration of claim
We now turn to the question of whether earnings potential and preferences for work diminish
while claiming DI. Following Moore (2015), we extend the regression (3) to allow the effect
of the reform on earnings to vary with the duration of a claim. This is done by interacting a
third order polynomial of that duration with the product of the age group, period and year
indicators that identifies exposure to the reform (see Appendix C.4 for details).33 To avoid
heterogeneity by correlated characteristics confounding differences in earnings responses by
claim duration, we also estimate the extended model that includes the reform-duration in-
teraction for separate demographic and disability groups.34
Using the full sample without stratification, estimates from the extended model imply
that the effects do indeed vary with the duration of a claim.35 This variation is traced in
Figure 3 that shows estimates up to a duration of 15 years, which corresponds to the 80th
percentile in the treatment group. The effects on the probability of receiving DI benefits and
on the amount received both initially rise in magnitude as the length of the claim prior to the
reform at the end of this period.
33If the DADID identification assumption (1) holds conditional on each duration of a claim, then the
average treatment effect on those exposed to the reform and its nonlinear variation with duration are obtained
from the coefficients on the interactions.
34In both the reform and non-reform periods, those who had been claiming DI for longer at entry to the
sample are older and are more likely to be female (see Appendix B Figure B2). The faction of fully disabled
benefit recipients rises with claim duration up to about 10 years, then falls (Figure B2). We document
heterogeneity in the effect of the reform by these characteristics in sections 5.5 and 5.6.
35For each of the outcomes, the coefficients of the interactions between the reform indicator and the third
order polynomial in duration are separately and jointly statistically significant (Appendix C.4, Table C6).
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reform increases up to about 6 years. Thereafter, both effects fall in magnitude. The initially
increasing effect on the benefit amount implies that medical reexamination and application
of more stringent entitlement rules resulted in greater upward revision to assessed earnings
capacity as claim duration lengthened up to 6 years. The decreasing revision from then on is
consistent with deterioration in earnings capacity as the claim lengthens offsetting the effect
of imposing stricter criteria.
The effect on employment (Panel C) changes little up to a claim duration of about two
years, and then declines rapidly with the length of a claim, becoming insignificantly different
from zero just above 8 years and bottoming out at around 12 years. This pattern does
not resemble the inverted U-shaped employment response to DI terminations, peaking after
about three years, that Moore (2015) finds with US data. The author suggests this could
reflect a rehabilitation effect — time on DI initially provides an opportunity to recover health
and work capacity — that is eventually dominated by increasing labor market detachment
as the duration of the claim lengthens. Besides the obvious institutional differences, the
discrepancy from the pattern we find may be partly due to the different nature of the reforms
examined.36 Moore estimates the response to a homogeneous treatment: the termination of
DI benefits. In our case, while all claimants were subject to the same reassessment process,
the consequences for their benefits differed, as is clear from the U-shaped relationship in
Panel B. However, even after scaling the employment effect by the benefit effect, the increase
in employment relative to a e1000 reduction in benefit income still declines steadily with
lengthening claim duration (see Appendix C.4 Figure C1).
The absolute effect on earnings also declines steadily with claim duration (Panel D).
There is less evidence of the effect bottoming out in this case and it remains significant even
after 15 years. Scaling by the benefit effect reveals a decreasing fraction of lost benefits
are replaced by earnings as claim duration lengthens (Appendix C.4 Figure C1). Those
36Two other US studies do not find the same pattern as Moore (2015). Autor et al. (2015) find that
employment and earnings fall even as the time waiting for a SSDI application to be decided lengthens, while
Gelber et al. (2017) find that labor supply responses to this program vary little with claim duration.
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Figure 3: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules
by duration of claim
A: DI Benefit receipt (pp) B: DI Benefit amount (e/year)
C: Employment (pp) D: Earnings (e/year)
Notes: Estimates of average effects of reassessment by length of time on DI at entry to the sample. Derived
from least squares estimates of β4j , j = 0, 1, 2, 3 in model (1) that appears in Appendix C.4. Estimates of
these parameters are given in Appendix C.4 Table C6). Shading indicates 95% confidence interval computed
from delta method standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level. pp = percentage points.
Sample size is 496,586 individuals and 2,482,930 observations.
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with short claim durations (less than a year) overcompensated through earnings for reduced
benefits. But those who had been claiming for 8 years or more were able to recover less than
half of more modest benefit reductions. Recipients who had been claiming for many years
had their assessed earnings capacity revised upward to a lesser degree and they were less able,
or possibly less willing, to increase their earnings to realise this more modest adjustment.
5.5 Effects by cause and degree of disability
To assess the hypothesis that benefit recipients who qualified through more subjectively
defined and difficult to verify conditions have the greatest earnings potential, we split the
sample into three groups according to main diagnosis at entry to DI—musculoskeletal dis-
orders, mental health disorders and a residual category of all other disorders—and estimate
the regression model (3) separately for each sub-sample. The estimates given in the top
panel of Table 4 show that, consistent with the hypothesis, the employment response to
reassessment is largest for those with musculoskeletal disorders, followed by those with men-
tal health disorders.37 This is entirely due to recipients with these conditions being much
more likely to exit DI after reassessment. Their absorption into work appears to have been
substantially lower. The employment effect is around 40% of the impact on the DI exit rate
for claimants with musculoskeletal and mental health conditions. For those in the residual
category of presumed more objective, verifiable disorders, the increase in employment is 70%
of the fall in DI participation. This discrepancy could be taken as indicative of overly strict
reassessment of recipients with musculoskeletal and mental health problems that produced
upwardly biased evaluation of their earnings capacity. Alternatively, the low absorption rate
reflects greater distaste for work among those who had qualified for DI through these two less
easily verifiable types of conditions. Unfortunately, we cannot assess the relative veracity of
these two explanations.
In absolute terms, the average earnings response is about twice as large for those with
37These differences, like all other heterogeneous effects referred to in the text, are significant. For all
heterogeneous effects on days worked and on income from other social transfers, see Appendix C.6 Table C9.
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Table 4: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules
by cause and degree of disability
Disability Insurance Labor Market No. individuals
Benefit Receipt Benefit Amount Employment Earnings
(pp) (e/year) (pp) (e/year)
Cause of disability
Musculoskeletal -19.81*** -2,015*** 7.82*** 1,221*** 144,172
(0.32) (58.06) (0.42) (83.47)
[23.03%] [27.83%] [18.84%] [16.93%]
Mental -16.14*** -1,549*** 6.45*** 1,156*** 177,596
(0.27) (51.82) (0.37) (66.17)
[18.34%] [18.49%] [22.22%] [27.45%]
Other -7.80*** -1,111*** 5.48*** 620*** 174,816
(0.31) (56.36) (0.37) (76.46)
[9.40%] [13.52%] [15.33%] [10.38%]
Degree of disability
Fully disabled -10.95*** -1,656*** 8.08*** 1,037*** 324,485
(0.18) (37.49) (0.26) (38.74)
[12.22%] [17.05%] [49.93%] [51.03%]
Partially disabled -20.73*** -1,243*** 4.00*** 838*** 172,101
(0.35) (57.40) (0.41) (99.65)
[26.24%] [25.30%] [6.06%] [7.09%]
Partially disabled
Not employed -29.25*** -2,032*** 10.90*** 1,315*** 44,087
(0.76) (156.4) (1.04) (274.3)
[32.48%] [22.72%] [53.93%] [34.50%]
Employed -19.04*** -1,383*** -0.66 548* 98,655
(0.55) (86.86) (0.41) (227)
[23.45%] [18.83%] [0.80%] [2.94%]
Notes: Group-specific least squares estimates of β4 from (3) for the respective outcome. Obtained by strat-
ification by group. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level in parentheses. In square




i (AGEi × PERIODi × Y EAR4) Ŷit − β̂4, where Ŷit is the predicted outcome from (3) and nT is the
number of individuals in the treatment (sub-)group. Tests of equality of the β4 parameters between all groups
compared (musculoskeletal vs other, mental vs other, full vs partially disabled etc. give p-values <0.01 for
all outcomes and comparisons with two exceptions: employment, mental vs other p=0.072; earnings, full vs
partial, p=0.067. Number of individuals is across all treatment and comparison groups. Number of obser-
vations is the number of individuals multiplied by 5. pp = percentage points. *** indicates significance at
the 1% level.
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musculoskeletal and mental health problems as it is for those with any other type of disorder.
The earnings effect relative to the predicted mean under the counterfactual (given in square
brackets) is largest for claimants with mental disorders (28%) and lowest for those in the
residual category (10%). This ranking is maintained when the earnings increase is expressed
per e1000 reduction in DI income received. Overall, benefit recipients with mental health and
musculoskeletal problems appear to have had greater scope to increase earnings in response
to cuts in DI benefits, which were more aggressive for these claimants as a result of being
reassessed to have greater earnings capacity.38 Further, the earnings effect declines steeply
with claim duration among recipients with the two more subjectively-defined conditions,
while the effect is almost constant for those with other conditions (see Appendix C.6 Figure
C2). This is consistent with work capacity and/or preferences deteriorating during the time
spent on DI only among those who qualify through more difficult to verify health problems.
Among the initially partially disabled, reassessment reduced the probability of remaining
on DI by twice as much as it did among the fully disabled (Table 4, middle panel). Despite
this, the employment effect on the partially disabled is only half as large as that on the
fully disabled. This is because a downward revision in the degree of disability could bring a
partially disabled claimant below the 15% threshold necessary to qualify for any DI, while the
same reduction might push a fully disabled claimant into partial disability. The differential
impact on employment is because 68 percent of partially disabled recipients were working
initially, compared with 18 percent of the fully disabled (Appendix B Table B5). The bottom
panel of the table reveals that reassessment raised the employment of the partially disabled
who were not initially working by almost as much as it raised the employment of the fully
disabled. The fully disabled increased their earnings by more than the partially disabled
both absolutely and relative to the counterfactual mean. But this is because there was a
greater fall in the benefit income received by the fully disabled. For a e1000 reduction in the
benefit received, the increase in earnings is similar (e626-674). Even those who had been
38The earnings responses are largest for those with mental and musculoskeletal conditions within all sex,
age and degree of disability groups (Appendix C.6 Tables C13 and C12).
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classified as fully disabled were able to increase earnings to an extent sufficient to replace
more than three fifths of the benefit income lost.
Figure 4: Earnings effect of reassessment by claim duration – heterogeneity
A: Degree of disability B: Employment of partially disabled)
Notes: Estimates of average effects of reassessment under stricter DI criteria by length of time on DI at
entry to the sample. Derived from least squares estimates of β4j , j = 0, 1, 2, 3 from (1) (see Appendix C)
estimated separately for each sub-sample. Shading indicates 95% confidence interval computed from delta
method standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level. Sample sizes are given in Table 4.
The earnings effect of reassessment declines more steeply with time on DI among fully
disabled recipients than it does among the partially disabled (Figure 4, Panel A).39 But
splitting the partially disabled by initial employment status reveals that the relationship
mainly differs with the latter characteristic (panel B). The earnings effect on the partially
disabled who were not initially employed falls steeply with time claiming DI. After a duration
of 3.5 years, there is no significant earnings effect in this group. In contrast, reassessment
induces the partially disabled who were initially working to raise their earnings, the effect
is always significant and it is as strong for those who had been on DI for 15 years as it is
for those who had just entered.40 This is consistent with partial disability combined with
employment being effective in maintaining earnings capacity and work preferences as the
time claiming DI lengthens, although it does not demonstrate this effect.
39Given the effect decreases with claim duration among the fully disabled, the presence of this relationship
in the full sample is not simply due to recipients with longer durations being more disabled.
40This is not because the relationship between benefit cuts and claim duration differs between the initially
working and non-working partially disabled (see Appendix C.6 Figure C3 Panel B and Figure C4 Panel B).
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5.6 Effects by age and sex
On average, we find that DI recipients had considerable earnings potential they could be
induced to utilize. This may be partly attributable to the age of those affected by the
reform, who, at 30-44, are younger than those targeted by most other DI reforms that have
been evaluated.41 The top panel of Table 5 reveals that the work and earnings responses
to reassessment are even stronger among recipients aged 30 to 39.42 Their probability of
employment increased by twice as much as the respective increase among those aged 40-44.
The employment effect relative to the predicted employment rate under the counterfactual is
also twice as large for the younger group (see estimates in square brackets). In absolute terms
and relative to the counterfactual mean, earnings also rise, on average, by twice as much
in the younger group, which is able to recover 68% of the average reduction in DI income
through increased labor market earnings compared with 55% of a smaller average loss for
the older group. These results consistently indicate greater realizable work and earnings
potential among the youngest DI recipients subjected to reassessment.43
In absolute terms, the employment response of female benefit recipients is almost twice as
large as that of male claimants (Table 5, bottom panel). Relative to the counterfactual, the
impact on the female employment rate is more than twice that on the male rate. Absolutely
and especially relative to the counterfactual mean, the positive impact on market earnings of
female recipients is considerably larger than the respective effect on male earnings. Women
are able to increase their earnings to replace a larger fraction of their lost DI benefits. The
41Borghans et al. (2014) examine a 1993 Dutch DI reform that impacted all recipients below the age of
45 but estimate the effect only at the upper margin of that age threshold. Karlström et al. (2008) find no
employment effect from withdrawal of laxer rules for those aged 60-64 to qualify for the Swedish DI program.
Staubli (2011) finds a positive impact of reduced DI entitlement on the employment of 55-56 year-olds in
Austria. Moore (2015) finds that younger (30-39 vs 50-61) US SSDI recipients who qualified through an
addiction had a larger employment response to the termination of their benefits. Three other papers also
find greater elasticity of labor supply with respect to DI at younger ages (Koning and van Sonsbeek 2017;
Kostol and Mogstad 2014; Von Wachter et al. 2011).
42Splitting this group into those aged 30-34 and 35-39 reveals little further heterogeneity.
43The younger group has a stronger earnings response irrespective of sex and cause of disability (Appendix
C.6, Tables C11) and C12). On average, the younger group was reassessed five months earlier than the older
group. If having more time to prepare for reassessment increases the labor market activity response to it,
then we are underestimating the ceteris paribus difference in this response by age.
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Table 5: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules
by age and gender
Disability Insurance Labor Market No. individuals
Benefit Receipt Benefit Amount Employment Earnings
(pp) (e/year) (pp) (e/year)
Age
30-39 years -16.68*** -1,823*** 8.55*** 1,248*** 330,042
(0.23) (36.09) (0.27) (51.01)
[20.19%] [24.48%] [25.17%] [23.28%]
40-44 years -11.35*** -1,225*** 4.30*** 667*** 363,412
(0.22) (39.47) (0.27) (53.30)
[12.73%] [14.06%] [12.27%] [11.29%]
Sex
Males -8.31*** -1,375*** 4.21*** 815*** 244,076
(0.25) (49.79) (0.32) (72.91)
[9.76%] [15.55%] [10.80%] [11.05%]
Females -18.32*** -1,769*** 7.87*** 1,338*** 252,510
(0.24) (38.39) (0.32) (46.90)
[41.38%] [42.43%] [24.68%] [31.71%]
Notes: Tests of equality of the effects (β4 parameters) between age groups and between genders give p-values
<0.01 for all outcomes and comparisons. Otherwise, notes as Table 4.
average earnings effect is three quarters of the average reduction in DI income for female
recipients, compared with three fifths for male recipients. Females were impacted more by
the reform and, judging by their response to it, this targeting appears to have been justified.44
The earnings response declines steeply with claim duration for males and the younger
age group but not for females and the older group (see Appendix C.6 Figure C2).45
6 Conclusion
Relieving the fiscal strain caused by swelling disability insurance programs while protecting
the wellbeing of benefit recipients with little latitude to raise their labor market earnings
requires targeting benefit cuts on those with residual, unused earnings potential. This paper
is one of only a few that deliver evidence on the employment and earnings effects of targeted
44Within each age group, the employment and earnings effects are larger for females than for males
(Appendix C.6 Table C11).
45The earnings effect scaled by the effect on benefit income declines with claim duration for both genders
and both age groups (Appendix C.6 Figure C4).
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reductions in the benefit entitlement of a stock of DI recipients—those aged 30-44 in the
Netherlands. Reassessment through a medical examination to review functional limitation
and application of more stringent rules to assess earnings capacity reduced the probability
of being on DI by 14.4 percentage points and the amount of benefit received by around 20
percent, on average. In response, employment rose by 6.7 percentage points and earnings
increased by 18 percent. For each e1000 reduction in DI benefit there was a e636 increase
in earnings, on average.
While these estimates indicate that some Dutch DI recipients had substantial potential to
substitute earnings for benefits, they were not a majority. All DI recipients younger than 45
had their entitlement reassessed under stricter criteria, and yet benefits were left unchanged
for almost three fifths of them. The strong earnings response is from a minority who fully or
partially lost benefits. Across-the-board cuts would have reduced the gains from insurance
and may have caused hardship among many benefit recipients who would have been unable
to raise their earnings to make up the loss of benefit income.
The Dutch reform appears to have been successful in targeting cuts on those with the
potential and inclination to respond by raising their earnings. Our analysis reveals that they
were disproportionately younger, female and diagnosed with a more subjectively defined
health condition, and that earnings potential was also higher among those who had been
claiming DI for a shorter period. The greater responsiveness found at younger ages, together
with the fact that the group targeted by the reform was younger (30-44) than those studied in
many papers that have found labor outcomes to be less responsive to DI (Chen and Van der
Klaauw 2008; Karlström et al. 2008; Staubli 2011), implies some limit on the extent to which
our results generalize. But given the falling average age of the stock of DI recipients in many
countries, estimates of the earnings potential of younger recipients are of increasing policy
relevance. Another characteristic that distinguishes the DI recipients examined in this paper
from those studied in many others is the high proportion (≈ 36%) claiming partial disability.
The opportunity afforded to this group to work while claiming DI may be expected to leave it
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better placed to substitute earnings for lost benefit income. If so, this could also explain why
we obtain relatively large estimates of the responsiveness of labor outcomes to DI benefits.
It turns out that while the partially disabled do manage to increase their earnings to recover
a slightly larger fraction of the reduction in benefit income, the difference is generated by
those who were not working initially. However, there is some evidence at least consistent
with partial disability combined with work reducing the extent to which earnings potential
declines as more time is spent on DI.
Our findings suggest that periodic, rigorous reassessment of the earnings capacity of the
stock of DI recipients could be effective in raising labor market activity by targeting benefit
cuts on those most able to respond by raising earnings. Such a policy, in contrast to the
indiscriminate withdrawal of benefits that sometimes has only a muted impact on earnings
(Koning and van Sonsbeek 2017), can possibly help achieve the optimal balance between the
provision of insurance and the preservation of work incentives. That said, we cannot be sure
that the reform examined improved efficiency. One reason is that while targeted cuts can
be more effective in inducing earnings responses, they are also costlier to implement than
across-the-board cuts that do not require manpower intensive case-by-case assessment. To
implement the reform, the benefits agency received an additional budget of e190m to cover
the hiring of new staff and the reintegration of recipients from whom benefits were withdrawn
(Minister of Social Affairs 2009). In addition, it is estimated that expenditure on other social
insurance and assistance programs rose by e550m as DI recipients sought to replace their
lost DI benefits with other transfers (ibid). Subtracting these two costs of the reform from an
estimated gross reduction in DI benefits of e1.1bn gives a net saving to the benefits agency
of e375m (ibid). From a fiscal perspective, the targeted cuts were beneficial. However, they
presumably reduced the welfare of DI recipients who had to increase labor supply effort to
protect living standards. If this earnings response largely consisted of an income effect of
lower non-labor income, as opposed to a price effect of the increased return on work, then
it would mostly signal change in the distribution of welfare resulting from redistribution of
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income, rather than a net gain in welfare through the correction of incentives. The income
effect of DI has been found to be much stronger than its substitution effect in both the US
(Gelber et al. 2017) and Switzerland (Deuchert and Eugster 2019). Unfortunately, it is not
possible to disentangle these two effects of the reform examined in this paper.
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